The Iranian regime this week has mounted an impressive show of strength, at least insofar as strength is defined by the regime. A huge rally for supporters shipped in from across the country, matched by violent suppression of opposition elements and a fierce e-crackdown on social networking which might have helped anti-regime protesters make a disruptive impact.

In the longer run Iran is in trouble, with large numbers of young people coming on the job market and no prospect of jobs because the economy is so mismanaged and corrupt. Those massed urban young people will be networked and angry enough, sooner or later, to provoke a convulsion of unforeseeable proportions.

What if it is later rather than sooner? What do those countries concerned at Iran’s defiance on nuclear issues do now, in the face of yet more defiance? Here is one article which argues eloquently but forlornly that there are no good options but that at least sanctions and/or negotiations are better than some sort of military response.

Part of the diplomatic problem is trying to work out who is weak and who is strong in this situation. By any normal criteria the Iran regime is weak and the USA administration is strong. Yet Iran’s very weakness in conventional terms makes it a formidable adversary. It feels it has nothing to lose. It has no need to talk, except on its own terms.

Iran knows that its formal demands are unacceptable even to such cynics as the Russians and Chinese. They do not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. But they feel pretty confident that if that happens, no Iran nuke will land on their territory: the Iranians know that they will get a businesslike response in kind. And there is a perverse upside for Beijing and Moscow in Iran getting a nuclear weapon or two, since American and EU policy will be shown to have failed. Which means that the ‘West’ is cut down a good notch in world prestige terms, making their own positions relatively stronger for no real cost.

Hence Iran can say what it likes, being abusive and obnoxious towards the democratic West like an obscene aggressive schoolyard bully bent on angering the weary teachers nearby.

Meanwhile for all its formal strength the Obama administration indeed lacks obvious options.

More sanctions (even if the Chinese and Russians do not dilute them right down in the UN haggling) will be unlikely to make any meaningful short-term impact on the Iran regime. If past experience is anything to go by (see eg Serbia), the main outcome of sanctions is to degrade the moderate middle classes and empower gangsters and demagogues.

Trying to negotiate with Tehran runs the real risk – as the limp-wristed Europeans have found out – that Iran will simply dishonestly string out any talks as it develops its nuclear weapons capabilities, making Washington look weak and ineffectual both internationally but (worse) at home.

Pouring energy and support into Iran to help the opposition overthrow the regime might make an unstable situation change drastically for the worse. Maybe the window of opportunity for doing that was missed a year ago anyway? And what if there is a huge punch-up in Iran with Washington backing the opposition, but the regime emerges the winner having massacred lots of young Iranians to make its point?

Military strikes? Wasn’t there some Nobel Peace Prize event recently?

It all boils down to a simple proposition: you don’t win more in any negotiation than your objective strength deserves.

In a struggle between a lion and a hyena, different sorts of strength (physical power, agility, guile, deviousness) all come into play.

Charles Crawford, a former British Ambassador turned blogger and policy pundit, looks at how UK policies shape global events – and how global events shape UK policies. For more information or to contact Charles Crawford, click here.

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